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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694171

20 February 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry  
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACCFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCDA-HO

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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## 1. (C) Section 1 Operations . Significant Activities

a. General. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1969, the 25th Infantry Division Artillery continued combat operations in support of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) III.

b. Organization for combat. See Inclosure 1.

c. Operations and significant activities.

### (1) 7th Battalion 11th Field Artillery

(a) During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969 the 7th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery continued Phase III of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) in the Tay Ninh area. The battalion remained headquartered at Tay Ninh Base Camp and its mission continued as direct support to the 1st Brigade. On the first of August the batteries were deployed as follows: Battery A at FSB Crook, Battery B at FSB Buell, and Battery C at FSB Sedgwick. In addition to providing direct support to the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, the battalion also provided artillery support to the 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, the ARVN Airborne working in the Tay Ninh area, and the US Navy patrolling the Vam Co Dong River. During the quarter the tactics of the brigade shifted from one to three day operations. Further emphasis was placed on platoon and squad-size patrols and ambushes. The primary effects on the artillery from the new tactics were: (1) the splitting up of forward observer parties, i.e. one artilleryman (FO, Recon Sgt, or RTO) with platoon size elements and (2) the moving of the artillery batteries to positions to support 3-day operations. In order to effectively support operations of the 1st Brigade it was necessary to move supporting artillery 90 times. The battalion controlled the fires of the following batteries: C-3/13 (GSR) located at Tay Ninh Base Camp, B-1/27 (GSR) located at FSB Stoneman, C-1/27 (GSR) at FSB Washington, A-6/15 (GSR) at FSB Rawlins, B-6/15 (GSR) at FSB Hunter, A-2/77(-)(attached) at FSB Wood, and the Phillipine Civic Action Group's 105-mm battery located at Tay Ninh Base Camp. The arrangement whereby the 2/32 Artillery controlled the fires of C-7/11, A-2/77, B-6/15, and FOR OT UT

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A-1/27 terminated on 3 August. The following manouvor elements were present in the 1st Brigade AO and received their artillery support through the 7th Bn, 11th FA: 3-22 Inf, 4-23 Inf (M), 2-34 Armor (-), 4-9 Inf, 2-22 Inf (M), and 3-4 Cav.

(b) The month of August 1969 was characterized by many (55) light to medium contacts. Fire Support Bases received standoff mortar and rocket attacks 33 times. Artillery in support of the 1st Brigade moved 34 times to support operations beyond artillery ranges of established FSB's. Sixty-two preparations were fired in support of combat assaults and approximately 83,500 rounds were expended.

(c) On 3 Aug, B/7-11 and an ARVN Abn 105-mm battery moved to FSB Wood to support a combined operation of the ARVN Abn and the 2-22 Inf (M) in the Dai Loi Woods for an indefinite period of time.

(d) At 1215 hours 6 Aug, A/C/2-22 Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT 5037. Contact broke at 1345 hours, resumed at 1825 hours, and broke again at 1900 hours. There was 1 US killed and 8 US wounded. A/2-77 (-) expended 853HE, B/7-11 expended 1305HE, A/1-27 expended 402HE, C/2-32 expended 112HE(8"), and D/3-13 expended 30HE(8") with surveillance of 2 VC KIA.

(e) At 1204 hours on 9 Aug, B/2-22 made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT 495382. Contact was broken at 1628 hours and resumed again at 1730 hours. There were 6 US and 8 ARVN KIA. B/7-11 expended 813HE, A/2-77 exp 667HE, B/1-5 exp 281HE, A/1-27 exp 72HE, and C/2-32 exp 53HE(8"). Surveillance: 11 VC KIA.

(f) On 11 Aug, II FF Arty began the exchange of the 7th Bn 9th FA for the 6th Bn, 15th FA. Three tubes per battery were exchanged on 11 Oct and the remaining three were exchanged on 12 and 13 Oct. A/7-9 went to FSB ST Barbara, B/7-9 to FSB Rawlins, and C/7-9 to FSB Hunter.

(g) On 14 Aug, A/2-77 (-) departed FSB Wood and returned to the control of its parent unit, the ARVN Abn 105-mm battery located inside FSB Wood moved to a position outside the FSB, C/7-9 moved from FSB Hunter to FSB Wood, and B/7-11 returned to FSB Duell after a 12 day stay at FSB Wood.

(h) At 0835 hours on 15 Aug, C/3-22 Inf received approximately 15 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds. At 1003 hours they made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT 098426. At 1655 hours LTC Mott, CO 7th Bn 11th FA, directed that B/7-11 move from FSB Duell to Cao Xa (XT 127520) to support C/3-22. They were in position ready to fire at 1805 hours and remained there to cover C/3-22 until 1730 hours 16 Aug.

(i) At 0205 hours on 17 Aug, the 1st ARVN Abn CP at XT 143432 was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The attack consisted of small arms and automatic weapons fire and approximately 200 rounds of mortar fire. At 0350 hours LTC Mott alerted B/7-11 for a move to Cao Xa (XT 127502) to support the 1st ARVN Abn. Battery B departed FSB Duell at 0630 hours and was in position at Cao Xa and

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ready to fire at 0700 hours. At approximately 0415 hours, contact was broken and no further contact was made during the day. B/7-11 was given march order for return to FSB Buell at 1630 hours. This battalion received no official confirmation of surveillance, however, the ARVN abn unofficially credited the US artillery support with 74 enemy KIA. LTC Hott was awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star for his battalion's support of the ARVN abn on 17 Aug. At 0320 hours, FSB ST Barbara received small arms, RPG, and mortar fire which lasted until 0400 hours resulting in 3 US KIA and 13 US WIA. Enemy losses were 15 KIA and several weapons captured. A/7-9 located at FSB ST Barbara expended over 600HE during the cited contact and the S3, 7-9 FA requested that 7/11 FA assist in obtaining a combat essential resupply of ammunition. Five sorties (600 rounds) were arranged through 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

(j) At 0202 hours 21 Aug, B/4-23 Inf (M) in a night defensive position in the vicinity of XT 2954 began receiving small arms, RPG, and mortar fire from the south side of Muoi Ba Don. Fire would cease when the artillery was firing, but whenever the artillery was allowed to die down, enemy fire would begin. B/4-23 received fire the rest of the night and at 0700 hours were still receiving sporadic small arms fire. B/7-11 expended 613HE, 182FC, and 177ILL; B/2-32 expended 31HE (8"), 3/7-9 expended 1042HE and 28FC; C/3-13 expended 205HE, and C/1-27 expended 48HE. Casualties were 6 US WIA and the enemy losses were 32 KIA (10 KIA) and 3 POW.

(k) The month of September marked a decline in the activity within the 1st Brigade area. The troops of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division made contact with the enemy approximately 30 times and incoming mortars and rockets were received 28 times during the month. The artillery support of the 1st Brigade fired approximately 91,000 rounds, made 31 moves, and fired a total of 54 preparations in support of the 1st Brigade during the month.

(l) At 0030 hours 5 Sep FSB Crook received 10 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. At 0045 hours TNBC received 13 107mm rockets. At 0345 hours 2-22 Inf (M) made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity XT 520349. (B/1-8 exp 1107 HE, C/7-9 exp 324HE, and D/3-13 exp 30HE 8"). A/2-34 Armor at the Rock Crusher received incoming at 0640, 0847, 1500, and 1737 hours. At 0912 hours, C/4-23 Inf (ii) received 10-15 rounds of unknown caliber mortar fire. At 0952 hours LTC Hott decided to move one 8" section from B/2-32 and 2 dusters from B/5-2 to the vicinity of XT500553 to support. The 8" and Dusters departed TNBC at 1152 hours and were in position ready to fire by 1300 hours. B/7-9 expended 1437HE, B/7-11 exp 1077HE, C/3-13 exp 485HE. There were 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA with surveillance of 10 VC KBA. At 1100 hours LTC Hott directed that the battalion's AN/TPQ4 radar located at TNBC move to FSB Buell and set up there as soon as possible.

(m) At 0145 hours, 11 Sep, FSB Washington received 7 82mm mortar rounds. At 0150 hours TNBC received 7 107mm rockets. At 0212 hours, Ben Sei received approximately 100 82mm mortar rounds. At 0220 hours and 0515 hours, FSB ST Barbara received 6-8 82mm mortars. At 0330 hours the Rock Crusher received 3 107mm rockets. At 0700-0804 hours, the Rock Crusher received a total of 17 82mm mortar rounds. At 0952 hours A/4-23 Inf (M) made contact with an unknown size enemy element in the vicinity of XT296570 and continued in contact until approximately 1400 hours.

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B/7-11 expended 1304HE, 108WP, and 47 smk; B/7-9 exp 1294HE, 101WP and 17 smk;  
B/2-32 exp 75HE 8". Prior to casualties were 2 US KIA, 5 US MIA, and 4 ARVN MIA.  
Enemy losses were 47 KIA (31 KBA) and 1 POW.

(n) On 18 Sep, one tube from B/7-11 went with 2-34 Armor to XT278615 with the mission of firing CS into caves with direct fire. They were able to place several rounds deep inside some caves but received no surveillance.

(o) On 21 Sep, the Thien Ngan CIDG made contact with a large NVA force in the vicinity of XT 8187 and suffered heavy casualties. A 1st Brigade task force consisting of A/3-22 Inf and B/7-11 FA was airlifted to the Thien Ngan CIDG camp on 22 Sep with a mission of bolstering the defense of the camp. B/7-11 had a secondary mission of offering additional fire support to the CIDG. B/7-11 was given a warning order at 1030 hours 22 Sep, the order to move was issued at 1559 hours, the first CH-47 sortie departed FSB Quail at 1705 hours, and the battery was in position ready to fire at Thien Ngan at 1845 hours. Thirty-four sorties using 10 aircraft were needed to move the battery. Resupply was accomplished by CH-47 helicopter. The battery moved back to FSB Quail on 25 Sep; however, the return trip was accomplished by CH-47 and C-130 aircraft (3 sorties). All class IV and V and the water trailer were returned by CH-47. The howitzer sections and vehicles were airlifted from the Thien Ngan airstrip by C-130 aircraft.

(p) The month of October brought a general reduction in enemy activities within the brigade area with incoming rockets or mortars being received only twelve times during the month. The infantry tactics generally evolved from company size operations to platoon and squad size maneuvers. This resulted in many small skirmishes and an increase in Eagle Flights and combat assaults. To support operations during the month, artillery moved 25 times, fired 87 prop, and expended approximately 83,000 rounds.

(q) On 5 October, the ARVN Abn began operations in a new AO north and west of Tay Ninh Base Camp. They moved two 105-mm batteries to support their operations; one went to the vicinity of the old Tri Bi airstrip (XT 118692) and the other to just south of Mo Cong (XT 130640). The third battery which was previously split between Cao Xa and Ben Soi was consolidated at Ben Soi (XT 090474). Coordination was effected with the ARVN Abn to provide a 2000 meter blanket cleared area at all times around both US fire support bases (Crook and Washington) in their AO. Usually at night blanket clearance was also granted throughout their AO except for buffer zones around their night locations.

(r) At 0850 hours on 10 Oct, while fireballing to XT 100759 to support B-22 Inf and ARVN Abn operations, C/3-13 load M109 detonated a mine in the road at XT 115710. The M109 was a combat loss and two members of the battery were wounded. As far as can be determined from available records, this was the first occurrence of the loss of a field artillery piece to a mine in the 1st Brigade AO.

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(s) At 1220 hours 12 Oct, the Dau Tieng - Cu Chi convoy received mortars and 51 caliber fire from the vicinity of XT 430450. The attack was countered by B/4-23 Inf (M) and artillery fire from FSB Wood and Dau Tieng Base Camp. The quick response of the artillery can be credited to the detailed coordination effected between 7-11 FA and 1-5 FA (1st Inf Div Arty) concerning artillery coverage of the convoy along route 239 from FSB Hunter (CP 120) to Dau Tieng.

(t) On 13 October the mission of A/7-9 was changed to a straight GS mission. Priority of fires, enjoyed since the battery occupied FSB St Barbara was lost; however, the battery continued to monitor one of the FD nets of 7/11 FA to answer calls for fire from elements within range.

(u) FSB Sodgwick was closed on 17 and 19 October with Battery C moving to FSB Hunter. Thirty-four C1-47 and 2 CH-54 sorties were used during the move. To minimize the consumption of blade time, a landing zone was selected at XT 366 357 and all equipment and ammunition, with the exception of four sorties, were trucked from the landing zone to FSB Hunter.

(v) On 21 October, the 3-22 Inf initiated a battalion-size offensive operation on Nui Ba Den and on the auxiliary peak Nui Cau. The operation kicked off with a seven battery preparation, 15 minutes in length. To support the operation Btry C, 3-13 FA moved from Tay Ninh Base Camp to the vicinity of old FSB Bragg and remained there for the duration of the 4-day operation. A jump CP and retransmission unit were located with Btry C to facilitate communications with forward observers located on the northeast side of the mountain. Elements of 3-22 Inf laagered on the mountain three nights, but the only significant contact during the operation was made by A/2-34 Armor and an RF Co in blocking position on the northeast side of the mountain. On the first night of the operation they surprised a company-size element digging in in the vicinity of XT287 616 and engaged with tanks and a heavy volume of artillery fire resulting in a body count of 30 VC. There was 1 friendly (ARVN) soldier wounded.

(w) The battalion received M102 howitzers on 21 October. The battalion, assisted by the 25th S&T battalion, convoyed to Long Binh to pickup the weapons. M102's were issued to Btry B and A on 24 and 25 October respectively and were in full use after two days training. Training assistance was obtained from an officer from 2-32 FA and an NCO from 2-19 FA. The issue of M102's to Btry C was delayed because of parts missing at the time of issue from Long Binh.

(x) The idea of the establishment of a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) for the 1st Brigade/Tay Ninh Province area was conceived early in the quarter. Liaison and coordination were effected with the Province Chief via the Senior and Deputy Senior advisors. Construction of the facility began on 10 Sep by Co A, 65th Engr Bn, assisted by a group of personnel from the 7-11 FA. CPT Robert E. Gunter Jr. was assigned to the battalion from DIVARTY as OIC of the construction, organization, and operation of the CFSCC. The basic construction was completed on 23 October. Furnishings of the interior (self-help) began on 20 October and the CFSCC began full operation on 24 October with personnel from the following: US Army artillery, ARVN artillery, VNAF, US Air Force, and US Navy.

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## (2) 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery

(a) The Battalion continued support of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry in operation Toan Thang Phase III. On 2 August, Alpha and Delta companies, 2/14th Infantry received small arms fire at XT578303. Flame baths, tactical air, and artillery were placed on the target. The aircraft dropped ground fire while delivering their ordnance. B/1-8 expended 280, A/3-13 expended 107, and D/3-13 expended 36 HE Q rounds on the contact area. Contact was broken at 2000 hours. There were 5 US KIA and 14 WIA. 13 VC body count by air and ground troops resulted.

(b) On 8 August, A/1-8 closed FSB Emory enroute to their new position at Cu Chi Base Camp. The battery was laid and ready to fire at 0925 hours. The next morning, 1 platoon from A/1-8 was airlifted to PB Hunsley XT5927 to provide fire support for the elements of the 2/14th Infantry located at the same base. The guns were operational at 1045 hours.

(c) After a general 10 day lull the 2/14th Infantry at PB Hunsley received 10-15 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 17 WIA. The platoon of A/1-8 at Hunsley expended 73 "Killer Junior" (HE time fused rounds fired at short ranges) on a suspected mortar location. A/3-13 reinforced their fire with 30 HE rounds on grid 611267.

(d) The 3d of September marked a significant day in the history of the 1/8 Artillery in Vietnam. On this day at FSB Pershing MG Ellis Williamson, CG 25th Infantry Division, fired the 900,000th round from the 1/8 Artillery since its arrival in Vietnam in 1966. Attending the ceremony were Col Statham, Div Arty CO, LTC Crowe 1/8 Artillery CO, and the officers and men of 3 Battery. SFC Crosby, chief of firing battery, issued the commands to the cannoners as he had done in 1966 when commanding the gun that fired the first round by 1/8 Artillery in Vietnam.

(e) A Co 2/12 Infantry found 23 NVA bodies in graves on 11 September at grid 555288. They showed evidence of having been killed by artillery. C/1-8, D/1-8 and A/3-13 had fired on grids in the general vicinity on the 6th of September. B/1-8 - 7 JC; C/1-8 - 4 JC; A/3-13 - 5 JC; and D/3-13 - 7 JC were credited.

(f) After a relatively quiet period, fierce fighting broke out on 19 September just northwest of Cu Chi. Gunships enroute to refuel at Cu Chi drew ground fire at grid XT615168. They spotted two NVA platoons and immediately engaged with organic ordnance. The S3, 1/8 was conducting a VR at the time of the engagement and immediately diverted his mission to adjust artillery fires upon the fleeing enemy. Air strikes were requested. C/1-8 expended 524 HE rounds and was credited with 6 LC and 1 tunnel entrance uncovered. A/3-13 expended 214 HE rounds and was credited with 3 secondaries. The gunships claimed 10 JC.

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(g) Activity increased significantly toward the end of the month of September. PPS-5 sightings recorded a great deal of movement, the most significant being a spotting of 40-60 VC at grid 589273. D/1-8 expended 176 HE rounds and was credited with 20 JC. C/1-8 expended 32 HE rounds and was credited with 5 JC. At 1130 hours A&S Co's 2/12 Infantry received S/A and RPG fire at grid 513327. They attacked the well fortified enemy with artillery, air strikes, and gunships. When contact was broken at 1655 hours, D/1-8 had expended 1,172 HE rounds and was credited with 4 JC. C/7-9 expended 823 rounds and received 3 JC; D/3-13 expended 60 HE rounds and was credited with 3 JC. Air strikes claimed 10 BC and infantry ground troops claimed 10 JC. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 4 MIA listed off. This action took place on 26 September 1969.

(h) On 15 October an aircraft spotted an NVA base camp complete with bunkers and a supply area at grid 545345. D/3-13 expended 101 HE rounds and was credited with 7 JC, 2/3 base camp destroyed including 9 bunkers. B/1-8 expended 407 HE rounds and was credited with 10 BC and 10 bunkers destroyed.

(i) Coupled with the upswing in heavy infiltration, A/2-12 Infantry became engaged in the most significant contact of the month on the 24th of October. Inserting troops on grid 571301, the gunships received ground fire from grid 570303. The initial contact began at 1315 hours and for the next 5 hours only scattered resistance was encountered as the Infantry troops swept the area. At 1735 hours, A Co 2/12th Infantry, reinforced by one platoon from C Troop 3/4 Cavalry, engaged a firmly entrenched enemy armed with automatic weapons and RPG's at a distance of less than 10 meters. The battle, although short in duration, was the fiercest toe to toe fighting in over 5 months. Due to the close proximity of friendly troops, all types of fire support could not be utilized. The infantry troops under the protective fire of the APC's and Shoriden's of the 3/4 Cavalry, consolidated and reorganized their position into a more favorable location. When this was accomplished massive artillery, tactical air, and gunship fire power were brought to bear upon the enemy. An additional two companies were airlifted into the contact area to establish a night position not more than 500 meters from the contact area. Artillery expenditures were over one thousand rounds in the contact area. On a sweep of the area, next day, the bodies of 65 NVA were counted while friendly casualties were 10 KIA, and 17 WIA.

(j) During the quarterly reporting period the three batteries of 1st Battalion 8th Field Artillery were credited with 340 VC/NVA (BC), 31 VC/NVA (POSS), destruction of 35 buildings and 32 bunkers, and 69 secondary explosions.

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### (3) 2d Battalion 77th Field Artillery

(a) The 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery was actively engaged in support of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) III which continued from the previous quarter. During this period A/2-27 was inserted into a "hot" LZ, Patrol Base Rittgers received a heavy ground attack, and Patrol Base Kotre received a light ground probe. Each time 2d Battalion 77th Artillery, with supporting artillery units, provided the fire superiority to defeat the enemy. Reinforcement training of replacements, as well as on-the-job and proficiency training, continued.

(b) On 12 August 1969, Patrol Base Rittgers was to be established via XT 3514. A/2-27 Infantry was scheduled to combat assault into the area at 0700 hours and A/2-77 Artillery would follow after the LZ had been secured. At 0710 hours, A/2-27 was inserted via XT355147 and immediately began receiving heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned with organic and artillery. Units firing were B/2-77, B/3-13, and D/3-13. This contact continued throughout the day and at 1340 hours D/2-27 was inserted to reinforce A/2-27. At 2000 hours the contact was broken. During this period, the artillery continually pounded the enemy location. During the contact, US casualties were reported as 7 US KIA and 18 US WIA; light damage to 4 UH1H and 1 AH1G; moderate damage to 2 UH1H and heavy damage to 1 UH1H. A sweep of the contact area was made with the following results: 57 NVA (LC) and 74 NVA KIA (POSS). The following enemy equipment was captured: 11 AK-47 rifles, 1 pistol, 4 RPG launchers, 2 30 caliber machine guns, 1 radio and SOI, 5 pounds of medical supplies, and 5 pounds of documents. The following enemy equipment was destroyed: 2 51 caliber machine guns, 2000 rounds of AK-47 ammo, 5 RPG rounds and 2 anti-personnel mines. The final artillery expenditures fired during the contact were as follows: B/2-77 3680 HE; B/3-13 1220 HE; and D/3-13 193 HE

(c) At 0120 hours, 5 September 1969, Patrol Base Rittgers XT358147 began receiving intense small arms fire and incoming mortar and RPG rounds. At 0230 hours, enemy sappers began charging for the wire. They were able to penetrate the outer wire without setting off the trip flares strung along the outer defense. A/2-77 immediately began firing Killer Junior and B/2-77, B/3-13 and D/3-13 were adjusted onto the charging enemy. At 0223 hours, two of the gun pits took direct hits. One received a direct hit from a mortar and the other from a satchel charge. One gun had a tire blown by the mortar and the gun crew was wounded, but the gun continued to fire. During this period, the artillery continued to pound the reinforced NVA company. A body count of nine was found inside the wire. At 0430 hours, the enemy forces began withdrawing. The artillery pounded the enemy as they made their withdrawal. During the contact US casualties were reported as 2 US KIA; 22 US WIA, 12 of whom were members of A/2-77; 1 PRS-5 radar damaged; and 1 105mm howitzer damaged. ARVN casualties were reported as 11 ARVN WIA. A sweep around the patrol base was made at daybreak with the following results: 29 NVA (LC), 1 NVA POW. The following enemy equipment was captured: 2 AK-47 rifles; 6 AK-47 magazines; 5 RPG launchers, 31 RPG rounds; 5 Chi Com

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Claymores; 111 Chi Com hand grenades; and 1 Chi Com radio. The final artillery expenditures during the contact were: A/2-77 410 HE; B/2-77 1070 HE; B/3-13 250 HE; and D/3-13 80 HE.

(d) At 2255 hours, 12 October 1969, B/2-27 ambush patrol via XT333161 observed and engaged 5 VC with organic weapons. These VC had been picked-up by radar and engaged with artillery. In an attempt to get away from the artillery they walked into the AP. Several of the VC were killed and one was taken prisoner. At 0100 hours, 13 October 1969, Patrol Base Kotre (XT358147) began receiving a large number of 82mm mortars; RPG; small arms fire; and B/2-27 Infantry observed 40-80 VC around their location. This enemy force was engaged with organic weapons and artillery was adjusted onto the enemy location. Units firing were A/2-77, B/2-77, B/3-13, and D/3-13. At 0228 hours, the patrol base again received intense small arms fire. During the contact US casualties were reported as 2 US KIA (both were members of A/2-77). A sweep around the patrol base was made at daybreak with the following results: 11 VC (30); 7 VC KIA (POSS); and 2 VC POW (one of whom was the XO of the VC battalion). The following enemy equipment was captured: 4 AK 47 rifles; 1 satchel charge (10 lbs); 1 bamboo rocket launcher; 1 ammo pouch; 1 document (ID); 3 RPG rounds; 5 RPG boosters; 8 Chi Com hand grenades. The final artillery expenditures during the action were: A/2-77 295 HE, 12 FC; B/2-77 455 HE; B/3-13 145 HE; D/3-13 60 HE, 8 FC.

(e) On 1 September 1969, 2/77th Arty received word that it was scheduled to receive 18 new M102 howitzers. Plans and schedules immediately became the order of the day. A 3-day training session was coordinated with the 1/8 Arty. During this period, 3 battery executive officers; 3 chiefs of firing battery; and 18 section chiefs received instruction and training on the new howitzers. This training included: firing battery procedures, platforms and supports for the howitzers; and maintenance of the howitzers. On 10 September 1969 the batteries began receiving the new howitzers and the changeover was completed on 20 September 1969 with the exception of the 2 howitzers at Patrol Base Flock. On 24 October 1969 the remaining 2 howitzers were airlifted to Patrol Base Handel. 2/77 Arty is now providing timely and accurate fire upon the enemy with the highly mobile M102 howitzers.

(f) Personnel status slightly decreased during the quarter. The Battalion reached 95% of its authorized strength by the close of the first quarter of fiscal year 1970. During the quarter 87 valor (including 8 Silver Stars and 45 Bronze Stars), 75 Achievement, and 166 service awards were recommended for members of the battalion.

(g) During the past quarter, logistic operations consisted of coordinating resupply activities in support of the firing units. Ammunition expenditures were approximately the same as last quarter and the firing units are stocking the prescribed amount of ammunition. One emergency resupply of ammunition was necessary to A/2-77 Arty on 5 September 1969. Requisitioning has continued at normal pace and supplies of all classes have been regularly received.

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AVOCDL-HO

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. ACS CSFOR-65 (d1)

(h) During the quarter, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy movement within the 31 Bde AO was on the increase. Several PPS-4, PPS-5, and TPS-25 Radars were strategically located throughout the Bde AO. Approximately 1500 individuals were picked up by these radars during the quarter. These pick-ups were engaged with artillery and the following rounds were expended: 175mm - 2500 HE, 375 FC; 155mm - 500 HE, 90 FC; and 8" - 200 HE, 75 FC. During this quarter, the S2, 31 Bde and 2/77 Arty, received many reports concerning enemy bunker complexes and fighting positions. Numerous recon by fire missions with 8", 175mm, 155mm, and 105mm were conducted. 8" - 100 HE; 175mm - 50 HE; 155mm - 350 HE; and 105mm - 1100 rounds were expended with 26 bunkers destroyed, 10 fighting positions destroyed, 1 sampan destroyed, and 7 secondary explosions. Also received during the quarter were intelligence reports from the S2, 31 Bde and 2/77 Arty, concerning enemy locations; staging areas; suspect enemy locations; bunker complexes; and fighting positions. A nightly program of firing on these intelligence targets was developed. During the quarter, the following rounds were expended on these targets: 175mm - 12,500 HE; 155mm - 380 HE; 175mm - 525 HE; and 8" - 550 HE.

(i) The 21 Battalion 77th Artillery S5 section and medical section remained active in MEDCAPS and civic affairs programs. MEDCAPS were conducted on a recurring basis in two areas, namely, An Thi (AT414205) and Km Duc Hanh B (AT 575075). The medical section has treated approximately 1800 Vietnamese civilians during the quarter. In addition, the S5 section has distributed approximately 100,000 leaflets.

#### (4) 31 Battalion 13th Field Artillery

(a) The mission assigned to Battery A throughout the reporting period was general support reinforcing the fires of the 1st Battalion 3th Artillery. During this period Battery A received credit for destroying 37 bunkers, 40 VC/NVA KBA, 32 hootches destroyed, 55 secondary explosions, 3 fighting positions destroyed, and 2 foot bridges destroyed. The battery fired 816 missions.

(b) Battery B's mission during this reporting period was general support reinforcing the fires of the 21 Battalion 77th Artillery. The battery received credit for 32 VC/NVA KBA, 30 bunkers destroyed, 12 secondary explosions and 1 .51 caliber machine gun destroyed. The battery fired 367 missions.

(c) The mission assigned to Battery C during this reporting period was general support reinforcing the fires of the 7th Battalion 11th Artillery. Battery C displaced to new locations within the 1st Bde's T.O.A. a total of 10 times during this reporting period. The areas of displacement were: Fire Support Base (FSB) Mitchell 18-20 September, War Zone C 10 October 1969, French Fort 13 October 1969 and proximity of Mui Ba Den 21 October 1969. After each one of these operations the battery moved back to Tay Ninh Base Camp. During this period Battery C received credit for 29 VC/NVA KBA, 14 bunkers destroyed, and 7 secondary explosions.

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AVJCOM-110

15 November 1969

Subject: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. ADB CSFOA-65 (K1)

(d) FSB's Dovins and Stoneman each had two 3 Inch Howitzer pads constructed to include ammunition and powder storage facilities. Also constructed were personnel and FOC bunkers to enable the battery to displace up to 2 guns to either of the two fire support bases in a minimum amount of time with a minimum of equipment. The results have been faster emplacement of the weapons and rapid fire support to the maneuver units of the division. Prestockage of ammunition at FSB Dovins and FSB Stoneman reduced the resupply necessary for rapid displacement to either location almost 100%. In addition this has reduced the number of vehicles required and at the same time it has eliminated maintenance problems for those vehicles. During this period the battery received credit for 13 VC/NVA KBA, 3 possible VC/NVA KBA, 27 fighting positions destroyed, and 200 meters of trenchline destroyed.

(e) During the past quarter the 3d Battalion 13th Field Artillery was given the mission of providing trained forward observers and radio telephone operators to the 31 Squadron 4th United States Cavalry and the 2d Battalion 34th Armor. In order to insure that radio telephone operators are well versed in the latest techniques for requesting and adjusting artillery fire, a three day forward observer radio telephone operators school was established in the battalion headquarters area at Cu Chi Base Camp. Two enlisted men selected from each of the four firing batteries in the battalion and two from Headquarters Battery attended. As the men successfully completed the school they are placed in an RTO Pool to be called upon as needed in the field. Two classes have been conducted to date. Subject areas are: Equipment familiarization, communications security, operating instruments and aids, method of target location lessons learned in Vietnam, antennae, and radio procedures.

(f) During this reporting period the battalion was also given the mission of establishing a school for AN/PPS-5 radar operations in the 25th Infantry Division. An instructors course was conducted in the battalion area from 12 October 1969 to 15 October 1969. The first class for students from the maneuver units of the division was conducted from 19 October 1969 to 23 October 1969.

#### (5) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

(a) Intelligence Operations. Continuous emphasis has been placed on effective employment of counter mortar radars based on intelligence throughout the 25th Division AO. The 25th Infantry Division Artillery presently has one counter mortar radar assigned to each direct support battalion. One AN/MPQ-4A radar is OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery from 11 Field Force artillery located at FSB Washington (XT1456). The AN/MPQ-4A radar organic to the 7th Battalion 11th Artillery is located at FSB Buell (XT2153) to counter the threat from the Nui Ba Den (mountain) area. The AN/MPQ-4A radar of the 1st Battalion 8th Artillery is located at FSB Patton to cover the area south of the Boi Loi Woods (XT5225). The AN/MPQ-4A of the 2d Battalion 77th Artillery is located at FSB Chamberlain (AS4302).

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AVCJ-110

15 November 1967

Subject: Operational Control of the 31st Infantry Division Artillery for the  
ending 31 October 1967, AOS 0200-05 (1)

The receipt of operational control of the 31st Brigade 9th Infantry Division resulted in the addition of 2 AN/MPQ-4A radars located at Chuay Son (XS561) and Tan An (XS544). A total of 11 mortar/rocket sites were located by the six counter mortar radars during this period. The majority of attacks were out of the primary sector of beam of the AN/MPQ-4A radars. The Surveillance radar program was also greatly affected during this period. The Division Artillery AN/PPS-25 radar has operated at Ben Hoa (IT2343), Tru Cu (154777) and is presently located at Go Dau Ha (IT3025), monitoring activity along the Van 3 River to the northwest and the Angels Wing (center of mass AT 3021) to the southwest. The 265th Field Artillery Detachment was moved from FSB Patten to Ben Duc (XS755) to monitor activity along the Son Van 2 River. It is now operating in the 2nd Brigade area at Tran Lap (XS810). The AN/PPS-25 located in the 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division at Tan Phu (XS71) has essentially maintained surveillance of that area. The 25th Infantry Division Artillery has acquired all AN/PPS-5 (1) radars assigned to the 25th Division and the AN/PPS-5 (2) radars assigned to the 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division. The 25th Division Artillery maintains a daily account of the activity of these radars and recommends locations to increase the target acquisition capabilities of the radars. The AN/PPS-5 radars are employed with six in the 1st Brigade, five in the 2d Brigade, 4 in the 3d Brigade, and 9 in the 3rd Brigade. In addition, Division Artillery is conducting an AN/PPS-5 radar school to familiarize operators with the operation of the radar sets, thus greatly increasing their target acquisition capabilities. Eventually all AN/PPS-5 radar sections will receive training at this school. A total of 3211 radar sightings were made by the AN/PPS-5 radars. A total of 1138 radar sightings were made by the AN/PPS-25 radars resulting in a total of 1170 engagements for both types of radars.

(b) Survey operations in this period consisted of reconfirming previously established control points by electronic observation and ground traverse, in addition to the extension of new survey control, where required, throughout the 25th Division FAOL. Control points have been established within 1000 ft of all semi-permanent type Fire Support Bases. Radar observation towers have been surveyed to give greater target location accuracy. The survey section is presently completing survey for the observation towers at Tay Ninh Base Camp. The survey information center is continually updating trig lists with new data.

(c) Division Artillery AO's were used to exploit radar sightings and targets provided by the Division Artillery TIC and Division TIC. The observers flew many hours in support of night missions. A course in Aerial Observation was conducted to fill in qualifying non-AO's.

(d) All meteorological electronic commitments for IIFFV and 25th Infantry Division were completed. No visual methods were used. Due to the shortage of trained personnel a training program is continually in progress to qualify untrained personnel and upgrade the quality of meteorological technicians. The meteorological messages are being broadcast to firing batteries on all radio in accordance with new IIFFV policy and schedules.

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AVC-100-110

15 November 1969

Subject: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. ACS CS&A-65 (41)

(c) Civil Affairs activities increased during the reporting period. Although there have been no specific requests made by the village officials, several projects have been initiated throughout the District. One such project is providing desks and chairs, constructed from ammo boxes, to schools in the District. In addition to the numerous Weddings conducted in the District, several Mitocaps have also been conducted by this headquarters. Common emphasis is being placed on civil affairs activities by this and higher headquarters.

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2. (C) Section 2, Items 1 through 4: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendation.

a. Personnel:

(1) Officer Personnel Rotation

(a) Observation. Division Artillery was experiencing officer personnel losses without timely replacements.

(b) Evaluation. It has been determined that the rotation curve for officers can best be flattened by giving first priority to thirty day losses and almost equal priority to sixty day and ninety day losses. When computed the slightly higher value of the ninety day loss will insure equal distribution of incoming officers.

(c) Recommendation. That first priority be given to thirty day losses and nearly equal priority to sixty and ninety day officer losses.

b. Training

(1) Direct Fire of 105mm XM629 CS Cartridge.

(a) Observation. A need existed for a method of putting CS into places such as cave entrances in the side of a mountain (Nui Ba Den) which were inaccessible by air-dropped and indirect fire CS munitions.

(b) Evaluation. During an operation on the north side of Nui Ba Den (vic XT2761) a single 105mm Howitzer section was used to fire the XM629, CS Cartridge (PD mode) into the cave entrance. White phosphorus (WP) and HI projectiles were used in the adjustment phase in order to observe the limited supply of CS rounds. The primary advantages of such an operation is that CS can be delivered into places that are inaccessible by other delivery means or where heavy casualties might be sustained in advancing toward the target area for manned delivery. Although untried thus far, it is believed that bunker complexes, hedgerows, and other hard targets can successfully be attacked by direct fire with XM629 CS Cartridges.

(c) Recommendation. That the 105mm howitzer be considered for the direct fire (point detonating) delivery of the XM629 CS Cartridge into cave entrances, tunnel entrances, and bunkers.

(2) Accurate FFE data utilizing FADAC in conjunction with PPS-5 Radars.

(a) Observation. At present, there is no rapid, reliable system available to determine the accuracy of unobserved fires shot in response to PPS-5 radar sightings.

(b) Evaluation. When PPS-5 radars are collocated with artillery batteries and they both have survey data to their locations, it is possible for the radar to be oriented by the battery's aiming circle set up over the orienting station. Once this is accomplished, the radar is capable of giving accurate direction to acquired targets.

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When a target is acquired, the data is passed to the artillery battery and entered into the FADAC using True Scale distance. By representing the location of the radar and observer location, the FADAC then computes accurate FFE data to the target. As the initial rounds are fired, the radar operator switches the radar to the Moving Target Indicator Mode. As the rounds impact upon the target, the target indicator blip on the screen widens. Varying widths of the target blip indicate the accuracy of the artillery fire.

(c) Recommendation. That this technique be disseminated to other units possessing the necessary survey data. In those locations where no orienting station is available, (e.g. patrol bases), the radar can be laid by magnetic azimuth and a check round fired to verify the lay. The rest of the operation would be the same.

### (3) Vectoring Night Hawk using TPS-25 and AN/MPQ-4A radars.

(a) Observation. Night Hawk aircraft frequently have difficulty finding the exact location of radar sightings and consequently are not able to conduct a surveillance of sighting area.

(b) Evaluation. When sightings are made by TPS-25 and/or AN/MPQ-4A radars it is possible to have these same radars vector the Night Hawk into the target area utilizing the radars as the aircraft tracking device. The procedure for the TPS-25 varies slightly in that the Night Hawk must fly over the radar's location and be picked up and vectored out from that position. For the AN/MPQ-4A all the Night Hawk has to do is enter the scan and his position is known. At the present, a greater success is being gained utilizing the AN/MPQ-4A due to its scan band being more oriented towards higher altitudes, while the TPS-25 is a ground-plane anti-personnel radar.

(c) Recommendation. That other units possessing the equipment use the TPS-25 and/or AN/MPQ-4A radars to precisely vector Night Hawk aircraft over surveillance areas.

### (4) Night Hawk used with Field Artillery.

(a) Observation. Night Hawk can be used as a field artillery target surveillance system provided proper communication is established between battalion FDC and the patrol aircraft.

(b) Evaluation. Field artillery units fire extensively at night on targets acquired by radar, dufflebags, or other sensors, yet have no means for immediate surveillance. Night Hawk has also been used as a target acquisition means and has operated on the infantry battalion command net. Since the aircraft flies at an altitude between 500 and 1000 feet, it had been the practice of checkfiring relatively large areas while the Night Hawk was on patrol. If a target was acquired by other means in his patrol area, the battalion FDC contacted the artillery liaison officer at the maneuver battalion command post, who in turn had the Night Hawk notified of the artillery fires and requested surveillance after the mission was complete.

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Det De Vrijde

[illegible]

(c) Recommendation. Air artillery direct air support team to be one A1/A2-24 for direct contact with night Hawk aircraft for artillery control surveillance and warning of artillery fire.

(5) Present a Final Draft for AID, 1 week after

[illegible]

(b) Evaluation. By extracolumn unit correction for deviation of 100 feet from tables checked with FFT (FT 105-10-2), which are used by the battery FDC personnel. These checked to within  $\pm 2$  miles with change in the direction of registration  $\pm 1$  within  $\pm 2$  miles firing 3200 miles from the station. Copies of the wire cards for changes 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are attached to enclosures 5 and 6.

(c) Recommendation. Post field assignment and see official wind cards become available.

(5) FADAC Operator's Book

(2) Observation. It is possible for the RTC in the FDC to trans. no numbers when given data from the PADAC.

(b) Evaluation. Once an individual has established a 3 or 4 digit number in his mind he is apt to hear a similar number (ie., transposed numbers) as the initial number.

(c) Recommendation. That the FADAC operator also monitor the "read back" of firing data from the guns. He has the readout in front of him and can insure the RIO did not send wrong firing data to the guns. Since he is idle between computation of observer corrections, this does not impede his efficiency.

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(7) \_\_\_\_\_

(i) observation, in a controlled laboratory setting, 1992  
 laboratory results to support any finding or opinion regarding the

(b) Evaluation. The battery is tested and evaluated in accordance with the necessary tests specified in the applicable standard, and the test results are recorded in the test report. The battery, when tested, is dry, clean, and protected against moisture and corrosion.

(c) Does nondiscrimination in the plan apply to all employees (2,3,4) considered in any plan for the purpose of nondiscrimination?

(c) know and freely admitly using the 1st birth.

(a) Observation. During the observation period (10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.) the artillery has been employed in a more active role than in previous days.

(b) Evaluation. During the many years that I have been in my official position, I have observed that the most common cause of accidents on the highway is the failure of the driver to take proper care of the vehicle. This is especially true in the case of commercial vehicles, which are often overloaded and poorly maintained. The most common type of accident involving commercial vehicles is the tipping over of a trailer. This is usually caused by a combination of factors, including excessive weight, improper loading, and poor road conditions. The most common cause of trailer tipping is excessive weight, which can cause the trailer to become unstable and tip over. Improper loading can also cause a trailer to tip over, as can poor road conditions. The most common cause of trailer tipping is excessive weight, which can cause the trailer to become unstable and tip over. Improper loading can also cause a trailer to tip over, as can poor road conditions.

(c) Recommendation. That the above recommendation be reversed thereby providing a wider wheel base.

C. Arabin

(1) Safety during firing: 100% filter.

(c) Observation. Use of the M103 began with a concern and the need for emphasis on safety of the gun crew.

(b) Evaluation. It has been noted that due to the configuration of the M102, as opposed to the M101A2, more emphasis must be placed on safety during fire missions for the No. 1 cannoner. Numerous incidents have occurred with the No. 1 cannoner being brushed by the recoil mechanism of the howitzer.

(c) Recommendation. In the more stringent training program to be instituted for personnel of the howitzer crews, with special emphasis being given to left-handed NO 1 cannonners, since these individuals are having the most difficulty with this position. If they (the left-handed men) are unable to safely handle the rounds and at the same time stay clear of the recoil, they should be re-assigned to another position within the section. This training should be supervised closely by both the Battery Executive Officer and the Chief of Firing Battery.


d. Intelligence; Jones

c. Logistics None

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f. Organization None

g. Other None



DAN D. STEDHAM  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

6 Incls

1. Listing Of Units
2. Sketch Of Junker
3. Sketch of Junker
4. Sketch of Junker

~~5. Ind Card~~

~~6. Ind Card~~

Incls 5 and 6 wd HQ, DA

## DISTRIBUTION:

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AVDCM (1 Dec 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1969, ACS CJFUR - 65 (R2)

DA, HQ 25th Inf Div, APO San Francisco 96225

1. RU: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFBC-RL-H, APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPCP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1969.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning raising priority for 60 and 90 day loss officer replacement, Section 2, Paragraph a, Item (1), cannot take action at this level. Giving 60 and 90 day losses a priority nearly equal to that given 30 day losses would require an overstrength posture that 25th Infantry Division does not have.

b. (U) Reference all other items, concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JOHN R. RANDOLPH  
LTC, GS  
Acting Chief of Staff

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**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10**

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AVFBC-RE-H (15 Nov 69) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concure with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery for the period  
ending 31 October 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. C. DONALD  
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOH-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Officer Personnel Rotation", page 14, paragraph 2a(1); concur. However, this headquarters projects combat arms officer replacements on non-rated captains through lieutenant colonels about 30 days in advance of the officer's scheduled arrival. Lieutenants are assigned as they arrive in-country based on unit branch strengths at the time. Experience has shown that longer range projection of unit officer replacements is impractical because of the extreme personnel turbulence in this theater.

b. Reference item concerning "Direct Fire of 105mm XM629 CS Cartridge", page 14, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Direct fire is always the most efficient method against hard targets.

c. Reference item concerning "Accurate FFE data utilizing FADAC in conjunction with PPS-5 Radars", page 14, paragraph 2b(2); concur. This is a basic artillery procedure, you have to know where the target is before you can attack it. The use of radar assists greatly in determining the accuracy of artillery.

d. Reference item concerning "Vectoring Night Hawk using AN/TPS-25 and AM/MPQ-4A radars", page 15, paragraph 2b(3); concur. Vectoring Night Hawk with Radar has application to all units who have the capability; therefore, this item will be extracted and considered for inclusion in USARV's publication "battlefield Reports - Tips for Commanders".

e. Reference item concerning "Night Hawk used with Field Artillery", page 15, paragraph 2b(4); nonconcur. The recommendation that direct support battalions be issued a UHF radio for direct contact with Night Hawks will duplicate the FM capability already existing. Further, direct requests to Night Hawk from the direct support battalion would, in effect, establish two agencies directing the activities of Night Hawks.

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSF0K-65 (R2)

f. Reference item concerning "Preparation of Wind Cards for M104  
(105mm) Howitzers", page 16, paragraph 2b(5); concur. However, the  
item as an official publication arrived in the unit after the report  
was forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*(Handwritten signature)*

Cy furn:  
25th Inf Div Arty  
II FFV

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division Artillery  
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVCDA-HQ

15 November 1969

Subject: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFON-65 (A1)

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Organic Units

1/3 Artillery (105 How, Fwd)  
2/77 Artillery (105 How Towel)  
3/13 Artillery (155/3" SP)  
7/11 Artillery (105 How, Towel)

Attached Units

A/5/2 Artillery (AW)(SP)  
3d Plt, Btry I, 27th Arty (SLT)  
3d & 5th Sections, Btry D, 71st Arty (MG)


General Support Reinforcing

7/7 (-) Arty (105)  
1/27 (-) Arty (155)  
5/42 (-) Arty (155)

Incl 1

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Each of the four sections will sleep two men thus providing for an entire howitzer crew.

Initial Construction: The halves that form the individual cubicles are nailed to the tops of the ammo boxes. PSP is laid across the top to form the base for the culvert halves in the center.

FIGURE 1

Incl 2

30"  
Culvert  
Halves

105mm  
Ammo  
Boxes

# SKETCH OF PERSONNEL BUNKER




FIGURE 2

After the initial construction is completed, two layers of sandbags are used to cover the entire top of the bunker. Additional sandbags are used on the ends to reinforce the ammo boxes. Blast wall may also be constructed at each end of the center walkway. The ends of the individual cubicles may be blocked off using sandbags and one ammo box with screen for ventilation or a blast wall may be constructed approximately three feet out thus providing more room and better ventilation.

SKETCH OF PERSONNEL BUNKER

5 Culvert Halves




FIGURE 3

The space between the individual cubicles under the PJP may be left open on the inside for storage of individual equipment. A third layer of sandbags may be added to the top for additional protection.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

| DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D  |  |                                   |
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